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International	Law,	Institutional	Moral	Reasoning,	and	Secession‡	
David	Lefkowitz,	University	of	Richmond	
Participants	in	the	contemporary	debate	over	the	morality	of	secession	are	
typically	categorized	in	terms	of	the	conditions	they	argue	are	necessary	and/or	
sufficient	for	a	group	to	possess	a	moral	right	to	secede.1		Remedial-right,	or	just-
cause,	theorists	maintain	that	groups	enjoy	a	right	to	unilaterally	secede	only	if	they	
are	the	victims	of	serious	injustice.		Primary	right	theorists,	in	contrast,	argue	that	
even	in	the	absence	of	injustice	the	promotion	of	political	self-determination	
grounds	a	right	to	unilateral	secession,	with	some	disagreement	as	to	whether	this	
right	is	possessed	only	by	nations	or	by	any	group	able	and	willing	to	perform	the	
functions	that	morally	justify	the	state.		Moral	theorists	of	secession	may	also	be	
categorized	by	their	method,	however,	and	as	I	will	demonstrate	in	this	paper	the	
methodological	dispute	is	the	more	fundamental	one.		Institutionalists	such	as	
Buchanan	and	Norman	maintain	that	secession	and	a	right	thereto	are	inherently	
institutional	concepts,	and	so	can	only	be	theorized	on	the	basis	of	institutional	
moral	reasoning.2		Pre-institutionalists	such	as	Altman	and	Wellman,	Moore,	and	
																																																								
‡	Published	in	Law	and	Philosophy	37	(2018):	385-413.	
1	The	conditions	I	have	in	mind	here	include	both	features	possessed	by	the	group	and	characteristics	
of	the	circumstances	they	inhabit.	
2	Allen	Buchanan,	Justice,	Legitimacy,	and	Self-Determination:	Moral	Foundations	for	International	Law	
(New	York:	Oxford	University	Press,	2004);	Allen	Buchanan,	“Secession,”	The	Stanford	Encyclopedia	
of	Philosophy	(Summer	2013	Edition),	Edward	N.	Zalta	(ed.),	URL	=	
http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2013/entries/secession/;	Wayne	Norman,	“The	Ethics	of	
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Weinstock,	defend	the	possibility	of	a	pre-institutional	moral	right	to	secession,	and	
distinguish	arguments,	and	the	mode	of	argument,	appropriate	to	establishing	the	
existence	of	such	a	right	and	its	content	from	the	question	of	whether	a	right	to	
secession	ought	to	be	institutionalized	in	international	law	(and,	if	it	should,	the	
extent	to	which	the	content	of	the	legal	right	should	mirror	the	content	of	the	moral	
right).3					
My	first	goal	in	this	paper	is	to	defend	the	institutional	view;	i.e.	the	claim	
that	secession	is	an	inherently	institutional	concept	and	that	therefore	we	ought	to	
use	institutional	moral	reasoning	to	argue	for	or	against	a	right	to	secession.		For	
reasons	that	will	become	clear	below,	this	leaves	any	specific	argument	regarding	
the	morality	of	secession	vulnerable	to	the	critique	that	we	lack	the	empirical	
evidence	necessary	to	sustain	its	conclusion.		My	second	aim,	then,	is	to	consider	the	
argument	for	this	claim	and	to	explore	how	we	ought	to	proceed	if	there	is	some	
truth	to	it.		Finally,	I	argue	that	to	the	extent	we	are	warranted	in	our	judgments	
regarding	the	effects	rival	international	legal	norms	governing	secession	will	have	
on	the	advancement	of	peace	and	the	secure	enjoyment	of	basic	human	rights,	we	
should	for	the	time	being	preserve	international	law’s	existing	stance.		That	is,	we	
																																																								
Secession	as	the	Regulation	of	Secessionist	Politics,”	in	National	Self-Determination	and	Secession,	ed.	
Margaret	Moore	(New	York:	Oxford	University	Press,	1998):	34-61.	
3	Andrew	Altman	and	Christopher	Heath	Wellman,	A	Liberal	Theory	of	International	Justice	(New	
York:	Oxford	University	Press,	2009);	Margaret	Moore,	The	Ethics	of	Nationalism	(New	York:	Oxford	
University	Press,	2001);	Daniel	Weinstock,	“Constitutionalizing	the	Right	to	Secede,”	The	Journal	of	
Political	Philosophy	9:2	(2001):	182-203.	
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ought	to	maintain	the	absence	of	any	right	to	secede	outside	the	colonial	context,	
rather	than	reform	international	law	so	that	it	includes	either	a	remedial	or	a	
nationalist	or	plebiscitary	primary	right	to	secession.			
I	begin	in	section	I	with	a	characterization	of	the	concept	of	secession	that	I	
argue	better	captures	its	common	use	to	describe,	explain,	or	justify	conduct	than	
does	a	rival	analysis	offered	by	Altman	and	Wellman.		In	section	II	I	defend	the	claim	
that	secession	is	an	inherently	institutional	concept,	and	explain	why	we	ought	to	
employ	institutional	moral	reasoning	to	theorize	a	right	to	engage	in	it.		The	
argument	I	sketch	for	these	conclusions	rests	on	two	key	claims.		First,	I	maintain	
that	we	should	distinguish	between	the	value	of	political	self-determination	and	the	
norm	governing	secession.		Second,	I	contend	that	any	argument	for	or	against	a	
candidate	norm	governing	secession	ought	to	be	grounded	in	an	accurate	
understanding	of	the	nature	of	norms;	that	is,	their	mode	of	existence	and	the	
manner	in	which	they	causally	contribute	to	the	production	of	social	order.		These	
features	account	in	turn	for	the	properties	that	characterize	institutional	moral	
reasoning,	most	importantly	the	centrality	of	empirical	claims	to	the	success	or	
failure	of	any	normative	theory	of	secession.			
In	section	III	I	employ	the	distinction	between	ideal	and	non-ideal	theory	to	
rebut	several	objections	to	the	claim	that	a	right	to	secession	ought	to	be	theorized	
institutionally.		As	these	arguments	demonstrate,	secession’s	inherently	institutional	
nature	does	not	rule	out	the	possibility	that	an	ideal	or	fully	just	international	law	
includes	a	primary	right	to	unilateral	secession,	national	or	plebiscitary.		Like	
Buchanan,	however,	I	argue	that	the	claim	that	it	does	can	be	little	more	than	
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speculation.		In	section	IV	I	consider	Altman	and	Wellman’s	allegation	that	the	same	
conclusion	holds	for	any	claim	regarding	the	international	legal	norm	that	ought	to	
govern	secession	at	present.		In	response,	I	maintain	that	for	the	time	being	we	
ought	to	adopt	a	precautionary	approach	to	arguing	for	an	international	legal	right	
to	secession,	and	that	this	favors	a	remedial-right	to	secession	over	either	a	
nationalist	or	plebiscitary	primary	right.		In	the	fifth	and	final	section,	however,	I	
offer	several	reasons	to	doubt	that	international	law	would	better	serve	to	advance	
even	the	minimal	goals	of	peace	and	the	secure	enjoyment	of	basic	human	rights	
were	we	to	replace	the	current	prohibition	on	unilateral	secession	with	a	remedial-
right.	
I	
Secession	involves	essentially	a	claim	to	sovereign	equality.		Necessarily,	to	
attempt	to	secede	is	to	assert	both	(a)	one’s	independence	from	the	rule	of	the	agent	
that	previously	enjoyed	jurisdiction	over	one,	and	(b)	one’s	enjoyment	of	the	same	
rights,	liberties,	powers,	and	immunities	possessed	by	the	agent	whose	jurisdiction	
one	now	contests.4		This	construal	of	secession	captures	federal	as	well	as	
																																																								
4	We	can	distinguish	analytically	between	secession,	which	involves	essentially	a	claim	to	equal	
standing	within	a	given	community,	and	claims	regarding	the	specific	rights,	liberties,	powers,	and	
immunities	members	with	that	standing	in	the	community	ought	to	enjoy.		In	some	cases,	a	group	
may	simultaneously	advance	both	claims;	i.e.	assert	a	right	to	be	recognized	as	a	sovereign	equal	and	
challenge	one	or	another	aspect	of	what	it	means	to	be	a	sovereign	equal	in	the	community	in	
question.		In	other	cases,	however,	a	group	may	advance	only	one	or	the	other	of	these	two	claims;	
e.g.	demand	treatment	as	a	sovereign	equal	on	the	community’s	current	understanding	of	what	such	
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international	political	secession;	i.e.	attempts	to	create	new	states	within	federal	
republics	such	as	India	and	the	United	States,	as	well	as	attempts	to	create	new	
states	within	the	existing	international	legal	order.		Moreover,	it	also	characterizes	
conduct	undertaken	by	parishes	or	congregations	within	organized	religions	(as	has	
recently	occurred	in	the	Episcopal	and	Presbyterian	Churches	in	the	United	States)	
and	chapters	or	other	administrative	sub-units	in	civic	groups	(such	as	the	Boy	
Scouts	of	America).5			
Per	the	above	analysis,	one	agent’s	challenge	to	another’s	rule	over	it	counts	
as	secession	only	if	the	party	mounting	the	challenge	claims	the	right	to	exercise	
itself	the	very	same	panoply	of	rights,	liberties,	powers,	and	immunities	enjoyed	–	or	
that	it	maintains	ought	to	be	enjoyed	–	by	the	current	ruler.		As	I	explain	in	the	next	
section,	the	content	of	that	set	of	rights,	liberties,	powers,	and	immunities	depends	
on	the	particular	institutional	form	political	order	takes	at	the	point	in	time	in	which	
a	particular	group	engages	in	secession.6		It	follows	that	in	a	world	in	which	states	
																																																								
treatment	involves.		For	a	group	that	simultaneously	advances	both	claims,	its	attempt	at	secession	
succeeds	as	long	as	it	is	recognized	as	a	sovereign	equal,	entitled	to	the	same	panoply	of	rights,	
liberties,	etc.,	enjoyed	by	other	members	of	the	community	in	question,	regardless	of	whether	it	also	
succeeds	in	its	attempt	to	modify	the	shared	understanding	of	those	incidents	that	characterize	
sovereign	equality.	
5	This	observation	highlights	an	important	methodological	point,	namely	that	the	degree	to	which	a	
proposed	characterization	captures	the	actual	use	of	the	concept	ought	to	figure	centrally	in	our	
judgment	regarding	its	truth.	
6	Institutions	are	“a	public	system	of	rules	which	define	offices	and	positions	with	their	rights	and	
duties,	powers	and	immunities,	and	the	like”	(John	Rawls,	A	Theory	of	Justice,	Revised	Edition	
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play	the	central	role	in	the	institutional	realization	of	political	order,	international	
political	secession	necessarily	involves	a	claim	to	that	set	of	rights,	liberties,	powers,	
and	immunities	states	enjoy	under	international	law,	or	that	the	secessionists	
maintain	states	ought	to	enjoy	as	a	matter	of	international	law.7		In	other	words,	in	
such	a	world	secession	necessarily	involves	a	claim	to	recognitional	legitimacy.8	
Altman	and	Wellman	maintain	otherwise.		The	concept	of	secession,	they	
assert,	“does	not	include	any	reference	to	international	law	or	to	any	type	of	
institution,”	but	only	“the	withdrawal	of	a	territory	from	the	jurisdictional	
boundaries	of	an	existing	state.”9		Therefore	“there	is	no	conceptual	contradiction	in	
a	separatist	group	asserting,	“we	have	a	right	to	secede,	but	we	make	no	claim	to	
recognitional	legitimacy.””10		In	order	to	assess	this	claim	we	must	first	get	clear	on	
what	it	would	mean	to	make	no	claim	to	recognitional	legitimacy.		Recognitional	
legitimacy	consists	in	the	satisfaction	of	the	conditions	necessary	and/or	sufficient	
to	qualify	as	a	state	under	international	law,	in	virtue	of	which	an	institutionally	
																																																								
(Cambridge,	MA:	Belknap	Press,	2003):	p.	47).		See	also	Buchanan,	Justice,	p.	2;	David	Wiens,	
“Prescribing	Institutions	Without	Ideal	Theory,”	Journal	of	Political	Philosophy,	20:1	(2012):	pp.	46-7;	
and	the	discussion	in	fn	21.	
7	As	Buchanan	writes,	“Secessionists	typically	assert	that	they	have	a	right	to	their	own	legitimate	
state,	and	a	legitimate	state	is	an	institutionally	defined	entity,	an	entity	defined	as	having	certain	
rights,	powers,	and	immunity	under	international	law”	(Buchanan,	Justice,	p.	24).	
8	Henceforth	I	use	the	term	‘secession’	to	refer	to	‘international	political	secession.’	
9	Altman	and	Wellman,	Liberal	Theory,	p.	57.	
10	Ibid.	
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organized	group	enjoys	the	legal	incidents	that	states	possess.11		A	group	that	claims	
recognitional	legitimacy	simply	asserts	that	it	meets	those	conditions	(or,	perhaps,	
that	it	could	do	so	were	other	actors	to	refrain	from	internationally	illegal	conduct,	
such	as	unjust	occupation	of	the	group’s	territory).		That	is,	to	claim	recognitional	
legitimacy	is	to	maintain	that	one	is	a	state	possessed	of	all	those	rights,	liberties,	
powers,	and	immunities	that	accrue	to	states	under	international	law.12		For	
secessionists	to	refrain	from	claiming	recognitional	legitimacy,	then,	would	require	
either	that	they	govern	both	people	and	territory	but	assert	no	entitlement	to	do	so	
–	no	right	to	territorial	integrity,	to	border	control,	to	exclusive	jurisdiction	over	
their	subjects	vis-à-vis	a	wide	range	of	conduct,	etc.	–	or	that	they	assert	a	right	to	
rule	but	reject	the	entire	institutionalized	political	order	constituted	by	
international	law.		The	former	seems	wildly	implausible,	and	may	well	be	at	odds	
with	the	concept	of	ruling	or	governing.		The	latter	is	certainly	possible;	indeed,	the	
Islamic	State	(IS)	–	or,	more	accurately	and	less	ironically,	the	purportedly	reborn	
Caliphate	–	provides	a	current	example.		But	IS	neither	characterizes	itself	as,	nor	is	
																																																								
11	See	Matthew	Craven,“Statehood,	Self-Determination,	and	Recognition”	in	International	Law.	(3rd	
ed.),	Malcolm	D.	Evans,	ed.	(Oxford:	Oxford	University	Press,	2010):	pp.	203-251;	James	R.	Crawford,	
The	Creation	of	States	in	International	Law,	2nd	Edition	(New	York:	Oxford	University	Press,	2007):	
375-415;	Glen	Anderson,	“Secession	in	International	Law	and	Relations:	What	Are	We	Talking	
About?”	Loyola	of	Los	Angeles	International	and	Comparative	Law	Review	35	(2013):	343-388. 
12	Note	that	the	concept	of	recognitional	legitimacy	says	nothing	about	what	standards	must	be	
satisfied	for	a	group	to	count	as	a	state,	either	as	a	descriptive	matter	or	as	a	normative	one.		It	takes	
no	stand,	that	is,	on	whether	the	declarative	or	constitutive	conception	of	recognitional	legitimacy	
accurately	describes	the	existing	legal	practice,	or	which	one	ought	to	do	so.	
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it	typically	characterized	by	others	as,	a	secessionist	group	precisely	because	it	does	
not	seek	the	status	of	an	independent	state	under	international	law	but	instead	the	
overthrow	of	a	global	political	order	organized	on	the	basis	of	equal	sovereign	
states.13		Altman	and	Wellman’s	conceptual	claim	seems	dubious,	then,	a	conclusion	
that	goes	unchallenged	by	the	arguments	they	marshal	to	support	it.	
Imagine	a	world	in	which	there	are	states	but	no	international	law,	they	
write.		In	such	a	world	it	would	be	impossible	to	claim	recognitional	legitimacy,	“yet	
a	separatist	group	could	quite	sensibly	assert	that	it	had	a	moral	right	of	
secession.”14		History	provides	compelling	reasons	to	concede	the	possibility	of	a	
world	composed	of	distinct	political	communities	in	the	absence	of	international	
law,	understood	as	a	political	order	premised	on	the	existence	of	modern	states.		
However,	history	does	not	warrant,	and	we	should	not	concede,	the	possibility	of	
secession	in	a	world	populated	by	agents	who	lack	a	conception	of	political	order	
characterized	in	terms	of	sovereign	equality.		As	a	conceptual	matter	secession	
presumes	a	world	composed	of	political	communities	that	neither	claim	to	rule	nor	
to	be	ruled	by	one	another,	and	who	share	to	a	considerable	degree	a	common	
understanding	of	the	jurisdiction	that	comprises	the	independence	or	sovereignty	
																																																								
13	See	Tanisha	Fazal,	“Is	the	Islamic	State	a	Secessionist	Movement?”	The	International	Relations	and	
Security	Network,	February	20,	2015.		http://www.isn.ethz.ch/Digital-
Library/Articles/Detail/?id=188149;	last	accessed	July	17,	2015.			
14	Altman	and	Wellman	Liberal	Theory,	p.	57.	
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each	enjoys	vis-à-vis	the	other.15		And	regardless	of	whether	those	political	
communities	consist	of	states,	kingdoms,	or	empires,	secession	necessarily	involves	
a	claim	to	recognitional	legitimacy,	i.e.	to	the	status	of	a	sovereign	equal,	
characterized	in	terms	of	the	common	understanding	of	independent	jurisdiction	
that	prevails	at	the	time	a	group	seeks	to	secede.		To	put	the	point	in	terms	
commonly	employed	by	international	lawyers,	secession	is	conceivable	only	for	
those	for	whom	a	horizontal	political	order	is	conceivable.16		As	noted	above,	absent	
such	a	shared	understanding	a	group’s	normative	challenge	to	those	who	rule	can	
take	only	two	forms:	a	rejection	of	the	possibility	of	legitimate	political	authority	or	
a	claim	to	completely	replace	the	institutional	framework	in	which	horizontal	
political	authority	is	currently	realized	with	one	that	that	realizes	a	hierarchical	
political	authority,	as	in	the	case	of	IS’s	attempt	to	replace	the	authority	
institutionalized	in	modern	international	law	with	one	inspired	by	a	certain	
understanding	of	Islamic	law.		Thus	to	answer	another	of	Altman	and	Wellman’s	
																																																								
15	See,	for	example,	the	discussion	of	a	“nascent	international	law”	in	the	Fertile	Crescent,	northern	
India,	and	classical	Greece	in	Stephen	C.	Neff,	Justice	Among	Nations:	A	History	of	International	Law,	
(Harvard	University	Press,	2014):	13-31.	
16	“International	law	has	never	flourished	in	times	of	anarchy	(think	of	the	“Dark	Ages”	in	Europe	
from	500-1100	AD),	nor,	for	that	matter,	in	times	of	hegemony	(consider	the	Roman	Empire	from	50	
BC-300	AD).		The	ideal	environment	for	the	development	of	international	law	has	been	times	of	
“multi-polar”	international	relations,	where	a	number	of	States	have	competed	and	cooperated	in	a	
particular	part	of	the	world”	(David	J.	Bederman,	International	Law	Frameworks,	2nd	Edition	(New	
York:	Foundation	Press,	2006):	p.	2).		The	claim	here	is	that	a	norm	governed	“multi-polar”	world	is	a	
sine	qua	non	for	secession.	
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attempts	to	demonstrate	the	conceivability	of	secession	in	the	absence	of	
international	law,	we	can	imagine	a	group	attempting	to	secede	in	a	one-state	world,	
but	only	if	we	also	imagine	as	part	of	their	attempt	and	as	a	condition	for	its	success	
the	development	of	a	set	of	conventional	norms	that	delineate	the	domain	of	each	
putative	political	community’s	exclusive	jurisdiction	from	each	other,	and	that	
structures	or	informs	their	interactions	with	one	another.	
Secessionists	do	not	advocate	for	political	self-determination	in	the	abstract.		
Rather,	they	normally	advocate	for	a	particular,	concrete	specification	of	political	
self-determination,	namely	the	same	panoply	of	institutional	rights,	liberties,	
powers,	and	immunities	enjoyed	by	those	who	currently	rule	them.17		The	foregoing	
argument	demonstrates	that	doing	so	is	a	necessary	feature	of	secession.		In	the	next	
section	I	defend	the	claim	that	secession	is	an	inherently	institutional	concept,	and	
explain	why	it	follows	that	we	ought	to	employ	institutional	moral	reasoning	to	
theorize	it.			
II	
Much	of	the	discussion	regarding	a	right	to	secession	is	plagued	by	a	failure	
to	clearly	and	consistently	distinguish	claims	regarding	the	value	of	political	self-
determination	from	those	regarding	the	justifiability	of	a	norm	governing	secession.		
As	the	label	suggests,	a	theory	of	value	is	an	attempt	to	characterize	what	makes	
some	type	of	thing	(e.g.	object,	act,	experience,	state	of	affairs,	etc.)	valuable,	as	well	
																																																								
17	“Normally”	because,	again,	secessionists	occasionally	advocate	simultaneously	for	a	change	in	the	
incidents	constitutive	of	sovereign	equality.	
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as	the	appropriate	mode	of	valuing	that	thing	(e.g.	by	honoring	it,	or	promoting	it,	or	
maximizing	it,	and	so	on).		Familiar	examples	include	rival	attempts	to	characterize	
the	value	of	choice,	or	of	free	speech,	or	most	important	for	our	purposes	here,	the	
value	of	political	self-determination.		Yet	by	itself	an	account	of	what	makes	political	
self-determination	valuable,	and	the	mode	of	valuation	appropriate	to	it,	does	not	
tell	us	what	sort	of	treatment	counts	as	properly	valuing	an	agent’s	exercise	of	
political	self-determination.		Does	it	require	treatment	as	a	sovereign	equal,	for	
example,	or	only	one	or	another	form	of	intra-state	autonomy?		Perhaps	the	former	
in	some	circumstances,	and	the	latter	in	others	–	but	what	circumstances,	and	why?		
What	counts	as	an	appropriate	response	to	the	value	of	an	agent’s	exercise	of	
political	self-determination	in	a	context	in	which	we	are	also	required	to	value	other	
agents’	exercise	of	political	self-determination,	and/or	things	other	than	political	
self-determination?		These	questions	do	not	concern	the	inputs	that	ought	to	figure	
in	an	agent’s	deliberation;	that	is,	they	do	not	ask	us	to	characterize	the	kind	of	
considerations	to	which	an	agent	ought	to	be	responsive.		Rather,	these	questions	
assume	an	answer	to	that	question	and	ask	what	an	agent	ought	to	conclude	on	the	
basis	of	these	considerations;	specifically,	what	an	agent	ought	to	do	in	various	
circumstances	if	he,	she,	or	it	is	to	properly	value	the	exercise	of	political	self-
determination.		A	normative	theory	aspires	to	provide	an	answer	to	that	question.	
Norms	are	the	justifications	actors	deploy	in	order	to	hold	themselves	and	
one	another	accountable,	e.g.	for	their	conduct,	or	for	particular	outcomes,	or	for	
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their	character.18		They	exist	by	virtue	of	their	use	within	a	particular	community,	
and	conversely	a	community	exists	in	virtue	of	certain	actors’	–	its	members’	–		use	
of	a	common	(system	of)	norm(s)	to	regulate	or	structure	their	interactions	with	
one	another	(as	well	as,	in	many	cases,	non-members	and/or	the	natural	
environment).		At	any	given	moment,	a	normative	system	reflects	a	community’s	
current	understanding	of	the	values	to	which	its	members,	qua	members	of	that	
community,	ought	to	be	responsive,	and	determines	or	constitutes	what	counts	as	a	
proper	response	to	those	values	across	a	diverse	range	of	circumstances.		Reference	
to	the	community’s	current	understanding	highlights	an	important	feature	of	
normative	practices,	namely	that	they	evolve	over	time	as	members	of	the	
community	contest	one	another’s	claim	that	a	particular	norm	best	serves	to	
promote,	respect,	etc.	some	value,	or	dispute	the	values	to	which	members	of	the	
community	ought	to	be	responsive	qua	members	of	the	community,	or	debate	who	
counts	as	a	member	of	the	community,	and	so	on.		Indeed,	some	degree	of	
contestation	seems	almost	inevitable.		Such	is	the	case	with	the	norm	governing	
international	political	secession,	with	members	of	the	international	community	
constituted	by	international	law,	or	those	who	seek	to	influence	them	(including	
political	and	legal	theorists	writing	on	the	topic	of	secession),	offering	rival	accounts	
																																																								
18	For	a	more	detailed	exposition	of	this	and	many	other	claims	in	this	paragraph,	see	Gerald	
Postema,	“Custom,	Normative	Practice,	and	the	Law,”	Duke	Law	Journal	62	(2012):	707-38;	David	
Lefkowitz,	“Sources	in	Legal	Positivist	Theories:	Law	as	Necessarily	Posited	and	the	Challenge	of	
Customary	Law	Formation,”	in	Samantha	Besson	and	Jean	D’Aspremont	(eds.),	Oxford	Handbook	on	
the	Sources	of	International	Law	(Oxford	University	Press,	2017).	
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of	the	norm	that	ought	to	govern	international	political	secession.		The	account	of	
norms	I	offer	here	entails	that	any	argument	in	favor	of	a	particular	norm	governing	
international	political	secession	is	necessarily	a	claim	regarding	what	the	
international	law	governing	secession	ought	to	be.19	Put	another	way,	secession	is	
an	inherently	institutional	concept	because	it	is	a	normative	concept,	and	normative	
concepts	exist	and	have	the	content	they	do	in	virtue	of	their	figuring	in	the	often	
institutionalized	practice	of	holding	accountable	that	constitutes	a	group	of	actors	as	
a	particular	community.20			
	 If	norms	exist	by	virtue	of	their	practice	within	a	given	community,	then	to	
defend	or	criticize	a	norm	is	necessarily	to	make	a	claim	about	the	type	of	social	
world	one	thinks	will	obtain	if	members	of	that	community	adopt	it;	that	is,	if	they	
use	it	to	hold	one	another	and	themselves	accountable.		In	the	case	of	an	existing	
norm,	this	involves	a	description	of	the	actual	world	and	a	claim	regarding	the	
causal	contribution	the	norm	makes	to	its	realization,	both	of	which	may	be	
controversial.		In	the	case	of	a	proposed	norm	it	involves	a	description	of	a	possible	
social	world,	typically	one	alleged	to	be	feasible	under	certain	conditions	that	either	
currently	obtain	or	could	do	so	at	some	point	in	the	future,	and	a	claim	regarding	the	
																																																								
19	As	I	explain	in	the	next	section,	however,	it	need	not	be	a	claim	that	this	is	what	the	law	ought	to	
be	right	now.	
20	In	fn.	21	I	suggest	that	this	point	might	be	better	put	in	terms	of	the	conventional	nature	of	norms,	
with	institutions	characterizing	a	sub-set	of	normative	practices,	and	explain	why	I	nevertheless	
continue	to	describe	secession	as	an	inherently	institutional	concept	and	the	form	of	reasoning	
appropriate	to	theorizing	it	as	institutional	moral	reasoning.	
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causal	contribution	the	proposed	norm	would	make	to	its	realization,	both	of	which,	
again,	may	be	controversial.		In	either	case,	an	argument	for	or	against	a	particular	
norm	is	hostage	to	empirical	facts;	i.e.	to	the	truth	of	the	claim	that	under	certain	
conditions	the	norm	will	become	a	fairly	stable	part	of	the	practice	of	holding	
accountable	that	constitutes	the	community	in	question,	and	that	as	a	consequence	
the	social	world	will	take	the	form	the	argument’s	author	alleges	will	result	from	
members	use	of	that	norm	to	regulate	their	interactions	with	one	another.		To	be	
compelling,	such	an	argument	will	need	to	be	responsive	to	how	norms	work:	how	
they	causally	contribute	to	social	order,	under	what	conditions	they	produce	
particular	results,	how	they	originate	or	cease	to	exist,	what	factors	strengthen	or	
weaken	their	acceptance	(i.e.	legitimacy)	within	a	given	community,	and	so	on.		The	
phrase	‘institutional	moral	reasoning’	refers	to	this	approach	to	defending	or	
criticizing	norms.21			
																																																								
21	I	use	the	phrase	“institutional	moral	reasoning”	here	because	it	is	familiar	to	many	participants	in	
the	contemporary	debate	regarding	the	norm	that	ought	to	regulate	secession.		Nevertheless,	there	
are	a	number	of	ways	in	which	talk	of	“institutional	moral	reasoning”	may	mislead,	two	of	which	I	
want	to	briefly	address.		First,	it	wrongly	suggests	that	this	form	of	moral	reasoning	is	limited	to	
institutionalized	normative	practices,	i.e.	practices	that	exhibit	some	level	of	specialization	in	a	
community’s	practice	of	holding	accountable,	when	in	fact	it	also	applies	to	critical	moral	reflection	
on	non-institutionalized	normative	practices.		Arguably,	the	horizontal	nature	of	the	international	
political	community	entails	that	disputes	over	the	norm	that	ought	to	govern	international	political	
secession	concern	a	non-institutionalized	normative	practice.		If	so,	then	it	might	be	more	accurate	to	
describe	secession	as	an	inherently	conventional	concept	rather	than	an	inherently	institutional	one,	
though	the	basic	claim	remains	that	the	concept	of	secession	exists	in	virtue	of	its	use	by	members	of	
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Buchanan	uses	the	term	“teleological,”	while	Jack	Knight	and	James	Johnson	
employ	the	label	“consequentialist,”	to	describe	the	fact	that	institutional	moral	
reasoning	assesses	rival	candidates	for	a	norm	in	terms	of	the	social	(and	natural)	
worlds	they	produce.22		Both	terms	invite	misunderstanding,	however,	because	in	
some	contexts	they	are	used	as	labels	for	a	theory	of	value;	again,	an	account	of	what	
makes	something(s)	valuable	and	the	mode	of	valuation	we	ought	to	adopt	vis-à-vis	
that	thing(s).			But	to	claim	that	we	ought	to	evaluate	rival	candidate	norms	in	terms	
of	the	worlds	they	produce	or	constitute	is	not	yet	to	make	any	claim	regarding	the	
values	we	ought	to	use	to	rank	the	resulting	worlds.		While	some	might	argue	that	
we	should	use	a	consequentialist	theory	of	value	such	as	classical	act-utilitarianism	
																																																								
an	actual	or	allegedly	possible	community	of	sovereign	equals	(and	possibly	would-be	sovereign	
equals)	to	hold	themselves	and	one	another	to	account.			
Second,	the	phrase	“institutional	moral	reasoning”	may	suggest	that	we	can	distinguish	between	
those	rights,	liberties,	etc.,	actors	enjoy	in	virtue	of	their	membership	in	some	community	constituted	
by	a	particular	normative	practice,	and	those	rights,	liberties,	etc.,	some	creatures	enjoy	in	virtue	of	
one	or	another	non-relational	property,	such	as	sentience	or	autonomy.		My	position,	as	stated	in	the	
text,	is	that	such	an	understanding	confuses	an	account	of	what	is	valuable	with	an	account	of	what	
counts	as	properly	valuing	it	in	a	variety	of	circumstances,	in	some	of	which	agents	may	also	be	
required	to	value	other	things,	possibly	using	other	modes	of	valuation.		This	stance	does	not	rule	out	
the	possibility	that	there	may	still	be	good	reason	to	speak	of	non-	or	pre-institutional	rights	as	part	
of	a	theory	of	value,	despite	the	risk	of	confusing	them	with	institutional	rights,	i.e.	normative	claims	
to	specific	forms	of	treatment,	experiences,	objects,	etc.	
22	Buchanan,	Justice,	75;	Jack	Knight	and	James	Johnson,	The	Priority	of	Democracy:	The	Political	
Consequences	of	Pragmatism	(Princeton,	NJ:	Princeton	University	Press,	2011).	
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to	do	so,	others	may	advocate	for	a	theory	of	value	that	includes	individual	moral	
rights.		My	point	here	is	simply	that	to	argue	for	or	against	a	norm	one	must	do	more	
than	describe	what	would	make	the	world	good,	better,	or	best	(or	just,	or	more	just,	
or	fully	just);	one	must	also	elaborate	and	defend	an	account	of	how	the	norm	will	
function	to	produce	the	world	one	maintains	it	will.		Thus	a	compelling	defense	of	a	
norm	governing	secession	requires	a	detailed	account	of	how	international	law	
works,	or	how	it	could	be	made	to	work	under	certain	specified	conditions	
(consistent	with	the	envisioned	community	still	being	a	horizontal	political	order).23				
	 Any	norm	governing	secession	will	be	enmeshed	in	the	larger	system	of	
norms	that	structure	interactions	among	members	of	the	international	political	
community	(at	a	given	point	in	time).		This	reflects	the	fact	that	international	law	
																																																								
23	For	an	excellent	summary	of	the	various	respects	in	which	international	law	may	work,	i.e.	
causally	contribute	to	the	production	of	an	international	political	order,	see	Robert	Howse	and	Ruti	
Teitel,	“Beyond	Compliance:	Rethinking	Why	International	Law	Really	Matters,”	Global	Policy	1:2	
(2010):	127-36.		Elsewhere	I	argue	that	international	law’s	causal	contribution	qua	genuine	law	
requires	that	in	most	cases	most	of	those	over	whom	it	claims	jurisdiction	treat	it	as	legitimate,	
meaning	that	they	are	disposed	to	treat	it	as	a	conclusive	reason	to	act	as	the	law	directs	them	to	act	
(though	not	necessarily	as	the	only	conclusive	reason	they	have	to	perform	that	act).		I	also	point	out,	
however,	that	even	if	or	where	international	law	is	not	genuine	law,	or	in	terms	some	might	prefer,	
where	it	is	law	but	not	legitimate,	it	may	still	be	prudentially	and	morally	valuable.		See	David	
Lefkowitz,	“The	Legitimacy	of	International	Law,”	in	David	Held	and	Pietro	Maffettone	(eds.)	Global	
Political	Theory	(Cambridge:	Polity	Press,	2016):	98-116;	and	David	Lefkowitz,	“A	New	Philosophy	
for	International	Legal	Skepticism?		Dworkin,	Republicanism,	and	the	Rule	of	International	Law,”	
unpublished	manuscript.	
	 17	
structures	the	interactions	of	a	large	number	of	agents	who	are	responsive	to	a	
variety	of	values	–	or	at	least	to	a	variety	of	different,	sometimes	conflicting,	ways	of	
responding	to	the	same	value	–	and	whose	conduct	affects	one	another,	intentionally	
or	as	a	side-effect,	in	a	wide	range	of	different	circumstances.		As	a	result,	the	moral	
assessment	of	a	particular	legal	norm	governing	secession,	existing	or	proposed,	
ought	to	be	holistic.		This	requires	attention	to	the	contribution	that	norm	makes	or	
would	make	to	the	efficacy	of	other	norms	within	the	system,	whether	in	terms	of	
their	legitimacy	or	the	prudential	costs	or	benefits	attached	to	compliance	or	non-
compliance.		We	should	also	take	into	account,	as	best	we	can,	the	effects	on	the	
practice	of	holding	accountable	constitutive	of	other	legal	orders	(e.g.	domestic	law),	
as	well	as	non-legal	normative	orders	that	contribute	directly	or	indirectly	to	the	
realization	of	justice	(or	injustice).		Finally,	in	carrying	out	a	holistic	assessment	of	
an	institutional	norm	like	the	international	law	governing	secession	we	must	also	
pay	close	attention	to	institutional	capacity;	e.g.	the	design	of	those	mechanisms	or	
institutions	charged	with	adjudicating	disputes	over	the	applicability	of	a	norm	to	a	
specific	case,	or	with	its	enforcement	against	violators.	
	 In	any	community	constituted	by	a	normative	practice	that	regulates	the	
interactions	of	a	plurality	of	human	actors	responsive	to	diverse	values	across	a	
wide	variety	of	circumstances,	considerations	of	certainty	and	predictability,	
worries	regarding	the	abuse	of	nuanced	rules,	and	limits	on	actors’	cognitive	ability	
to	keep	track	of	the	content	of	complex	rules	argue	in	favor	of	norms	characterized	
by	generality.		This	implies	that	we	should	be	extremely	wary	of	inferring	from	an	
argument	that	a	given	norm	is	over-	or	under-inclusive	in	a	particular	case	that	it	
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ought	to	be	reformed.		Rather,	those	who	argue	for	reform	to	an	existing	norm	such	
as	the	current	international	legal	prohibition	on	unilateral	secession	must	make	a	
case	that	their	proposed	change	will	produce	a	moral	advance	when	taking	into	
account	all	of	those	circumstances	and	actors	covered	by	the	existing	norm.		
Likewise,	analogical	arguments	for	or	against	a	norm	governing	secession	may	have	
little	probative	value.		For	example,	we	ought	to	be	careful	about	drawing	any	
conclusions	regarding	the	justifiability	of	a	proposed	international	legal	norm	
governing	unilateral	secession	from	the	(presumed)	justifiability	of	a	law	permitting	
unilateral	divorce	in	a	particular	domestic	legal	order.		If	the	justifiability	of	the	
latter	norm	depends	on	the	presence	of	other	norms	(legal	and	non-legal),	
institutions,	institutional	capacities,	and	material	facts	that	are	radically	different	in	
the	sphere	of	international	relations,	it	will	offer	little	guidance	as	to	what	the	
international	legal	rule	governing	secession	ought	to	be.24	
More	could,	and	likely	should,	be	said	in	defense	of	the	claim	that	we	ought	to	
employ	institutional	moral	reasoning	to	theorize	a	right	to	secession,	especially	the	
metaphysics	of	norms	I	suggest	it	presumes.		Here,	however,	I	simply	want	to	point	
out	how	we	might	reconcile	the	view	sketched	in	this	section	with	some	of	the	
positions	defended	by	prominent	primary	right	theorists.		David	Miller,	for	example,	
																																																								
24	The	framework	outlined	in	the	text	can	be	used	to	morally	evaluate	international	legal	norms	
governing	conduct	other	than	secession,	of	course.		See,	for	example,	its	use	by	Henry	Shue	to	argue	
against	most	revisionist	just	war	theorists	that	the	morality	of	war	just	is	the	morally	best	law	of	war	
(“Do	We	Need	a	Morality	of	War?”	in	David	Rodin	and	Henry	Shue	(eds.)	Just	and	Unjust	Warriors:	
The	Moral	and	Legal	Status	of	Soldiers	(Oxford:	Oxford	University	Press:	2008):	87-111).	
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differentiates	a	political	theory	of	secession	from	a	legal	one	in	a	way	that	to	a	
considerable	extent	tracks	the	distinction	between	a	theory	of	value	and	a	theory	of	
norms	outlined	above.25		Consider,	too,	that	while	we	ought	not	to	rely	on	intuitions	
drawn	from	reflection	on	seemingly	infeasible	and/or	underspecified	cases	to	justify	
a	norm,	these	intuitions	may	well	play	a	central	role	in	the	development	of	an	
account	of	what	we	should	value	and	why	we	should	do	so.		Perhaps,	then,	we	might	
be	persuaded	by	the	hypothetical	forcible	annexation	example	Altman	and	Wellman	
use	to	argue	for	a	pre-institutional	right	to	secession	to	acknowledge	instead	the	
existence	of	a	moral	right	to	political	self-determination;	i.e.	a	claim	regarding	the	
value	of	political	self-determination	and	the	mode	of	valuation	appropriate	to	it.		
Insofar	as	one	of	the	fundamental	tasks	(indeed,	the	fundamental	task)	international	
law	performs	is	to	allocate	jurisdiction,	it	follows	that	the	enjoyment	or	exercise	of	
the	right	to	political	self-determination	should	figure	among	the	ends	that	a	morally	
defensible	international	legal	order	ought	to	advance.		But	what	the	scope	or	
content	that	right	might	be,	and	under	what	conditions	and	subject	to	what	
																																																								
25	David	Miller,	“Secession	and	the	Principle	of	Nationality,”	in	M.	Moore	(ed.)	National	Self-
Determination	and	Secession	(Oxford:	Oxford	University	Press:	1998):	64.		One	way	to	interpret	
Miller’s	argument	in	this	piece	is	as	follows:	the	principle	of	nationality	offers	an	account	of	the	value	
of	political	self-determination,	one	to	which	any	political	order	ought	to	be	responsive,	though	what	
norm	or	norms	constitute	the	best	response	to	that	value,	i.e.	what	rights	it	grounds,	depend	on	a	host	
of	other	factors,	some	empirical	and	some	normative	(e.g.	regarding	the	relative	importance	we	
ought	to	assign	to	political	self-determination	and	the	secure	enjoyment	of	various	basic	human	
rights).	
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procedures	a	group	might	rightfully	exercise	it,	are	questions	we	should	employ	
institutional	moral	reasoning	to	answer.	
III	
While	the	fact	that	secession	is	an	inherently	institutional	concept	has	certain	
implications	for	how	we	ought	to	theorize	it,	by	itself	it	entails	no	specific	conclusion	
regarding	the	existence	or	content	of	a	right	to	secession.		Rather,	as	I	argued	in	the	
previous	section,	the	conclusion	we	should	draw	on	the	basis	of	institutional	moral	
reasoning	depends	on	the	assumptions	we	make	about	how	the	world	works,	or	
could	work.		Thus	those	who	advocate	for	a	nationalist	or	plebiscitary	primary	right	
to	secession	can	argue	that	as	a	matter	of	ideal	or	full	compliance	theory	
international	law	includes	the	right	they	defend,	while	also	maintaining	that	as	a	
matter	of	non-ideal	or	partial	compliance	theory	international	law	includes	only	a	
remedial-right	to	secession,	or	perhaps	no	right	to	secession	at	all.26		The	
assumption	of	partial	compliance	is	clearly	implicit	in	the	argument	that	creating	an	
international	primary	right	to	secession	will	lead	to	an	increase	in	war	and	
violations	of	basic	human	rights.		If	we	assume	instead	that	fear,	greed,	hatred,	
jealousy,	a	lust	for	power	and	status,	bias	and	so	on	will	not	lead	to	resistance	to	
national	or	plebiscitary	groups’	attempts	to	secede,	and	that	groups	meeting	certain	
conditions	have	a	moral	right	to	political	self-determination,	it	is	less	obvious	why	
we	might	object	to	an	international	legal	order	containing	a	right	to	engage	in	such	
conduct.			
																																																								
26	See,	e.g.,	Moore,	Ethics,	pp.	205-6.	
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The	distinction	between	ideal	and	non-ideal	theory	enables	those	who	argue	
that	secession	must	be	theorized	institutionally	to	rebut	a	number	of	criticisms	
leveled	against	their	position.		For	example,	Daniel	Weinstock	maintains	that	unless	
we	postulate	a	pre-institutional	moral	right	to	secession	we	will	be	unable	to	
acknowledge	“what	seems	intuitively	plain,	namely,	that	when	the	circumstances	
are	just	too	hostile	to	grant	the	right…	then	there	will	be	some	moral	loss	inflicted	
upon	the	persons	whose	rights	have	been	overridden,	some	good	which	ought	to	
have	been	conferred	upon	her,	and	thus	there	will	be	some	balancing	of	the	moral	
ledger	that	will	still	have	to	be	done.”27		Likewise	Altman	and	Wellman	suggest	that	
only	a	pre-institutional	moral	right	to	secession	can	account	for	the	judgment	that	
even	if	“the	right	of	secession	is	justifiably	sacrificed	to	peace	and	human	rights…	
something	of	real	value	has	been	given	up,	namely,	a	certain	measure	of	respect	for	
the	deontological	principle	of	political	self-determination.”28		These	theorists	are	
mistaken,	however.		A	pre-institutional	right	to	secession	is	not	necessary	to	
warrant	the	judgment	that	the	legal	norm	governing	secession	we	ought	to	adopt	in	
the	present	circumstances	nevertheless	involves	a	“moral	loss.”		Rather,	we	can	
defend	it	on	the	basis	of	an	argument	that	employs	institutional	moral	reasoning	to	
demonstrate	that	as	a	matter	of	ideal	theory	(or,	perhaps,	an	idealized	but	still	non-
ideal	theory)	international	law	would	include,	say,	a	primary	right	to	plebiscitary	
secession.		We	could	be	warranted,	that	is,	in	maintaining	that	at	present	only	the	
																																																								
27	Weinstock,	“Constitutionalizing,”	pp.185-6.	
28	Altman	and	Wellman,	Liberal	Theory,	p.	56.	
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attempt	to	reform	to	international	law	so	that	it	includes	a	remedial-right	to	
secession	is	justifiable,	while	also	holding	that	even	if	successful	such	an	effort	at	
reform	would	not	produce	a	fully	just	international	law	governing	secession.		
Indeed,	the	defender	of	institutional	moral	reasoning	simply	maintains	that	we	can	
only	defend	this	conclusion	on	the	basis	of	such	an	argument.		For	such	a	theorist,	
the	claim	that	a	particular	legal	norm	governing	secession	is	justifiable	but	not	fully	
just	stands	in	need	of	an	empirically	informed	argument	regarding	the	motives,	
institutional	structures,	and	institutional	capacities	that	constitute	a	global	
normative	order	containing	a	primary	right	to	secession.			
Arguably,	we	ought	to	have	very	little	confidence	in	any	judgment	we	make	
regarding	the	global	political-legal	institutional	structure	that	will	best	advance	
justice	as	a	matter	of	ideal	theory.		This	uncertainty	may	characterize	both	ends	and	
means;	that	is,	what	justice	requires,	and	whether	a	world	composed	of	sovereign	
states	organized	according	to	international	law	will	best	realize	it.		Moreover,	even	if	
the	morally	optimal	global	political-legal	order	includes	states,	the	legal	incidents	
they	enjoy	may	differ	quite	significantly	from	those	states	possess	under	existing	
international	law.		Not	only	might	these	incidents	be	distributed	upward	and	
downward	–	e.g.	to	global	or	sub-state	regional	governmental	institutions	–	some	
forms	of	authority	that	are	currently	exercised	on	a	territorial	basis	might	come	to	
be	exercised	on,	e.g.,	a	functional	basis,	or	on	the	basis	of	membership	in	groups	
whose	identities	are	not	linked	to	specific	territories.29		Insofar	as	we	have	no	idea	
																																																								
29	See	Richard	T.	Ford,	“Law’s	Territory:	A	History	of	Jurisdiction,”	University	of		
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how	political	authority	will	be	allocated	in	such	a	world,	we	cannot	know	what	the	
consequences	of	an	international	legal	primary	right	to	secession	would	be,	and	so	
whether	it	would	fare	better	or	worse	than	other	norms	governing	secession	at	
advancing	peace,	basic	human	rights,	and	political	self-determination	(not	to	
mention	whatever	other	ends	we	might	one	day	be	confident	constitute	morally	
appropriate	goals	for	international	law).		Thus	any	moral	argument	for	a	primary	
right	to	unilateral	secession	is	bound	to	be	mere	conjecture,	and	should	be	put	in	a	
highly	conditional	form.30		
																																																								
Michigan	Law	Review,	97:4	(1999):	pp.	843-930.	
30	Whatever	international	legal	norm	might	govern	secession	in	an	ideal	world,	might	a	case	be	made	
that	if	certain	politically	feasible	changes	were	made	to	the	existing	global	order,	the	creation	of	a	
primary	right	to	secession	in	international	law	would	produce	no	more	wars	or	setbacks	to	basic	
human	rights	than	would	a	less	permissive	legal	right	to	secession	(or	a	categorical	prohibition)?	
David	Copp’s	and	Altman	and	Wellman’s	brief	arguments	that	an	international	court	exercise	
oversight	vis-à-vis	the	exercise	of	a	plebiscitary	right	to	secession	might	be	interpreted	along	these	
lines	(Altman	and	Wellman,	Liberal	Theory;	David	Copp,	“International	Law	and	Morality	in	the	
Theory	of	Secession,”	Journal	of	Ethics,	2	(1998):	pp.	219-45).		One	might	object	that	such	an	
arrangement	is	not	politically	feasible	in	the	foreseeable	future,	and	so	no	less	speculative	than	is	a	
claim	regarding	the	norm	that	would	govern	secession	in	an	ideal	(full-compliance)	world.			
Alternatively,	or	in	addition,	one	might	argue	that	Copp	and	Altman	and	Wellman	assume	the	
existence	of	institutions	and/or	institutional	capacities	the	development	of	which	would	count	as	the	
supersession	of	international	law,	not	its	reform.		That	is,	their	argument	requires	the	replacement	of	
the	horizontal	normative	order,	or	anarchical	society,	that	is	definitive	of	international	law	and	a	
necessary	condition	for	international	relations	with	the	vertical	normative	order	that	characterizes	
(even	a	federal)	state.	
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	 A	second	objection	to	the	argument	that	a	right	to	secession	can	only	be	
theorized	institutionally	is	that	while	such	an	approach	may	be	essential	to	creating	
just	institutions,	it	cannot	offer	us	any	guidance	regarding	the	permissibility	of	
undertaking	secession,	or	acting	to	support	or	suppress	it,	in	the	absence	of	such	
institutions.31		This	criticism	also	fails.		To	maintain	that	a	particular	group	enjoys	a	
moral	right	to	secede	is	simply	to	hold	that	international	law	ought	to	accord	that	
group	a	right	to	secede.		As	I	noted	above,	this	claim	might	be	formulated	in	either	
ideal	or	non-ideal	terms.		Consider	the	latter	first:	a	group	has	a	moral	right	to	
secede	if	and	only	if	the	legal	norm	that	currently	ought	to	govern	secession	would	
accord	them	such	a	right.		Note	that	this	is	consistent	with	maintaining	that,	all	
things	considered,	this	group	should	not	attempt	to	exercise	its	right	to	secession.		
As	for	a	formulation	of	this	claim	as	a	matter	of	ideal	theory,	it	too	will	need	to	be	
spelled	out	in	institutional	terms,	though	for	the	reasons	set	out	above,	it	will	likely	
be	a	very	speculative	claim.		The	key	point	is	that	the	necessity	of	theorizing	
secession	institutionally	does	not	entail	that	the	possession	of	a	right	to	secede	
depends	on	existing	institutional	norms,	but	only	on	an	empirically	informed	moral	
argument	that	the	institutional	(legal)	norm	that	ought	to	govern	secession	would	
accord	particular	actors	a	right	to	secede.32	
																																																								
31	For	a	valuable	discussion	of	this	objection,	see	Norman,	“Ethics	of	Secession,”	46.	
32	One	question	that	warrants	more	consideration	than	I	can	give	it	here	is	whether	in	the	case	of	a	
non-ideal	theory	of	the	right	to	secession	we	should	allow	for	the	possibility	of	the	moral	equivalent	
to	efficient	breach;	that	is,	norm	violating	conduct	that	is	nevertheless	justifiable	because	it	produces	
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IV	
Thus	far	I	have	sought	to	make	some	headway	in	the	debate	over	the	nature	
of	secession	and	how	we	ought	to	theorize	an	international	political	right	to	engage	
in	it.		I	turn	now	to	a	second	point	of	contention	between	remedial-right	theorists	
and	some	of	their	primary-right	interlocutors,	one	that	involves	competing	claims	
vis-à-vis	the	international	legal	norm	governing	secession	that	will	best	serve	now	
or	in	the	near	future	to	advance	or	honor	the	goals	of	peace,	the	secure	enjoyment	of	
basic	rights,	and	political	self-determination.		While	this	dispute	points	to	a	serious	
challenge	to	our	ability	to	defend	any	particular	international	law	governing	
secession,	I	argue	it	is	one	that	we	can	overcome	by	using	a	precautionary	approach	
to	defend	the	superiority	of	a	remedial-right	over	a	primary	one.	
Remedial-right-only	theorists,	Buchanan	foremost	among	them,	maintain	
that	the	morally	optimal	international	legal	norm	in	a	non-ideal	world	like	ours	
permits	secession	only	as	a	remedy	for	(a)	forcible	annexation	by	another	state,	or	
(b)	as	a	last	resort	response	to	serious	and	persistent	violations	of	basic	human	
rights.33		The	case	for	a	remedial-right	only	norm	rests	centrally	on	the	claim	that	it	
																																																								
a	superior	moral	outcome	to	the	one	that	would	result	from	norm	compliant	conduct,	even	taking	
into	account	the	costs	to	the	rule	of	law.	
33	Buchanan,	Justice,	353-9;	Buchanan,	“Secession,”	section	2.2.		See	also	Norman,	“Ethics	of	
Secession,”	41-3;	Steven	R.	Ratner,	The	Thin	Justice	of	International	Law	(New	York:	Oxford	
University	Press,	2015):	160-1.		Sometimes	Buchanan	includes	as	a	separate	ground	for	secession	
major	violations	of	intra-state	autonomy	agreements,	while	at	other	times	he	describes	such	
violations	as	falling	under	condition	(b)	above.		The	former	characterization	suggests	more	strongly	
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gets	the	incentives	right.		For	example,	Buchanan	alleges	that	such	a	norm	will	
encourage	state	officials	to	respect	the	basic	human	rights	of	their	subjects,	since	the	
failure	to	do	so	will	create	a	legal	path	to	the	loss	of	some	of	the	territory	over	which	
they	currently	rule.		A	remedial-right	only	legal	norm	may	also	promote	greater	
intrastate	autonomy,	if	its	explicit	restriction	of	a	unilateral	legal	right	to	secede	to	
victims	of	forcible	annexation	or	gross	violations	of	human	rights	makes	states	more	
willing	to	devolve	political	power	to	regional	or	local	government.		Were	a	remedial-
right	only	legal	norm	to	have	such	an	effect,	it	might	well	serve	to	advance	the	
political	self-determination	of	territorially	concentrated	groups,	and	perhaps	their	
secure	enjoyment	of	basic	human	rights	as	well.		In	contrast,	Buchanan	contends	
that	a	primary	legal	right	to	secession,	whether	nationalist	or	plebiscitary,	will	likely	
fare	worse	at	both	encouraging	peace	and	respect	for	basic	human	rights	and	
fostering	political	self-determination.		With	respect	to	the	former,	he	notes	that	
historically	attempts	to	unilaterally	secede	are	nearly	always	accompanied	by	
violence,	and	at	least	in	the	case	of	national	or	ethnic	groups,	frequently	involve	
campaigns	of	ethnic	cleansing	that	can	become	genocidal.		As	for	political	self-
determination,	Buchanan	suggests	that	the	creation	of	a	primary	legal	right	to	
unilateral	secession	would	likely	discourage	states	from	devolving	political	power	to	
regional	governments	and/or	investing	in	regions’	economic	development,	or	from	
facilitating	internal	migration,	immigration,	or	asylum,	all	out	of	fear	that	doing	so	
																																																								
than	the	latter	an	attribution	of	non-instrumental	value	to	political	self-determination,	though	
neither	formulation	constitutes	a	definitive	stance	on	that	question.	
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might	eventually	lead	to	secession	and	so	the	state’s	loss	of	territory	and	population	
(and	all	that	follows	from	it).		In	short,	a	more	permissive	legal	norm	governing	
secession	would	likely	do	a	worse	job	of	advancing	those	values	a	morally	defensible	
international	legal	order	should	aim	to	advance.		
Altman	and	Wellman	challenge	a	number	of	these	arguments.34		First,	they	
point	out	that	even	in	the	absence	of	any	international	legal	right	many	states	
already	refrain	from	devolving	political	power	to	regional	governments	and/or	
fostering	economic	development	in	those	regions	because	they	fear	it	will	lead	to	
secession.		It	is	not	obvious,	therefore,	that	the	creation	of	a	primary	legal	right	to	
secession	would	lead	to	an	increase	in	such	conduct,	and	if	it	would,	how	large	the	
increase	would	be.		Second,	they	note	that	the	devolution	of	political	power	to	sub-
state	regional	governments	has	sometimes	served	to	pacify	separatist	desires.		It	is	
possible,	therefore,	that	those	who	aim	to	preserve	the	existing	state	will	conclude	
that	they	are	more	likely	to	realize	this	end	by	promoting	intra-state	autonomy	than	
by	centralized	rule.	If	so,	then	state	officials	may	elect	to	devolve	political	power	to	
regional	governments	even	if	international	law	includes	a	primary	right	to	
secession.35		Finally,	Altman	and	Wellman	suggest	that	the	creation	of	a	primary	
																																																								
34	Altman	and	Wellman,	Liberal	Theory,	pp.	58-65.	
35	Altman	and	Wellman	fail	to	note	empirical	work	that	explores	the	conditions	under	which	the	
devolution	of	political	power	to	sub-state	regional	governments	reduces	or	increases	demands	for	
secession,	and	the	use	of	violence	in	its	pursuit.		Bakke	and	Wibbles,	for	instance,	argue	that	
devolution	increases	ethnic	rebellion	where	there	is	significant	economic	inequality	between	regions,	
and	where	territorially	concentrated	ethnic	or	national	groups	are	largely	excluded	from	national	
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international	legal	right	to	secession	may	strengthen	nationalist	or	would-be	
plebiscitary	groups’	bargaining	power	vis-à-vis	other	groups	within	the	state,	which	
may	enable	them	to	negotiate	domestic	political	and	legal	arrangements	that	better	
advance	their	secure	enjoyment	of	basic	human	rights	and/or	political	self-
determination.		In	other	words,	contrary	to	Buchanan’s	claim,	the	legal	ability	to	
threaten	secession	might	actually	facilitate	intra-state	autonomy.	
The	conclusion	Altman	and	Wellman	draw	on	the	basis	of	these	arguments	is	
not	that	international	law	ought	to	be	changed	so	as	to	include	a	primary	legal	right	
to	plebiscitary	secession.		Rather,	they	maintain	only	that	we	lack	the	data	to	draw	
any	conclusions	regarding	the	incentive	effects	of	different	international	legal	norms	
governing	secession.36		The	only	defensible	view	is	agnosticism:	“…judgment	should	
be	suspended	on	any	conclusion	about	a	right	to	secede	under	international	law	
until	those	potential	consequences	are	far	less	uncertain	than	they	are	at	this	stage	
in	the	scholarly	discussion	of	secession.”37		The	theorist	can	rest	content	with	such	a	
conclusion,	but	not	the	political	actor;	his	or	her	agnosticism	does	not	suspend	
judgment	but	leaves	intact	an	international	legal	order	that	more	or	less	prohibits	
unilateral	secession.		Assuming,	arguendo,	that	Altman	and	Wellman’s	agnosticism	is	
																																																								
government	(Bakke	and	Wibbels,	“Diversity,	Disparity,	and	Civil	Conflict	in	Federal	States,”	World	
Politics	59	(2006):	1-50).		If	far	more	states	are	characterized	by	the	presence	of	this	kind	of	
economic	inequality	and	political	representation	than	are	not,	then	only	rarely	will	states	have	good	
reason	to	pursue	the	devolution	of	political	power	as	a	means	to	head	off	secession.		
36	Altman	and	Wellman,	Liberal	Theory,	p.	64.	
37	Ibid,	59.	
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well	founded,	what	course	of	action	should	be	taken	by	those	political	actors	who	
could	influence	reform	to,	or	the	preservation	of,	international	law’s	current	stance	
vis-à-vis	secession?			
One	possibility	is	that	they	should	focus	their	limited	resources	elsewhere;	
for	example,	on	efforts	to	reform	international	legal	norms	where	we	have	data	that	
warrants	significantly	greater	confidence	that	this	will	lead	to	an	increase	in	
international	law’s	advancement	of	its	proper	moral	goals.		The	same	is	true	for	
those	who	aim	to	influence	the	conduct	of	political	actors,	including	theorists	of	
international	law	and	justice.		Insofar	as	they	wish	to	advocate	for	or	against	
changes	in	international	law	now,	rather	than	merely	developing	greater	knowledge	
on	the	basis	of	which,	at	some	future	point	in	time,	they	plan	to	offer	practical	
guidance,	they	should	steer	clear	of	secession.		While	this	strategy	should	not	be	
dismissed	out	of	hand,	it	also	seems	unsatisfactory	given	the	prevalence	of	
secessionist	movements,	the	number	of	violent	conflicts	to	which	they	give	rise,	and	
the	frequency	with	which	secession	is	mooted	as	a	solution	to	internal	conflicts	
(regardless	of	whether	they	originated	in	a	quest	for	independent	statehood).38		A	
second	possibility,	therefore,	is	to	employ	a	precautionary	approach	when	arguing	
																																																								
38	A	2003	study	found	that	about	half	the	civil	wars	since	the	end	of	the	Cold	War	involved	rebels	
seeking	to	secede	or	gain	substantial	intra-state	autonomy,	while	a	2001	study	found	that	roughly	
70%	of	civil	wars	since	1945	were	ethno-nationalist	in	nature.		See	David	S.	Sirosky,	“Explaining	
Secession,”	in	Aleksandar	Pavkovic	and	Peter	Radan	(eds.),	The	Ashgate	Research	Companion	to	
Secession	(Burlington,	VT:	Ashgate	Publishing,	2011)	for	citation	to	these	and	others	studies	that	
demonstrate	the	centrality	of	secession	movements	to	the	incidence	of	armed	conflict.		
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for	the	superiority	of	a	specific	international	legal	norm	governing	secession	over	its	
rivals.	
The	question	of	how	to	formulate	a	precautionary	principle	(or	set	of	
principles)	so	that	it	is	both	precise	enough	to	be	action	guiding	while	also	
compelling	as	a	principle	(or	principles)	of	rational	choice	is	a	vexed	issue.		
However,	Stephen	Gardner	finds	a	plausible	candidate	for	a	core	precautionary	
principle	in	Rawls	characterization	of	the	conditions	under	which	maximin	
reasoning	is	appropriate.39		These	conditions	are	as	follows:	the	actor	faces	a	choice	
under	uncertainty,	cares	little	for	the	potential	gains	he	forgoes	relative	to	the	
minimum	he	aims	to	secure,	and	views	the	failure	to	secure	that	minimum	as	
unacceptable	or	catastrophic.		Arguably	these	three	conditions	are	met	vis-à-vis	the	
selection	of	a	legal	norm	governing	secession.		First,	if	Altman	and	Wellman	
correctly	maintain	that	we	should	have	no	confidence	in	predictions	regarding	the	
outcomes	different	legal	norms	governing	secession	will	produce,	then	in	deciding	
whether	we	should	retain	the	existing	norm	or	instead	seek	to	replace	it	with	a	
more	permissive	one	we	choose	under	uncertainty.		Second,	there	appears	to	be	a	
fairly	widespread	consensus	(at	least	among	liberal	political	and	legal	theorists)	that	
peace	and	the	secure	enjoyment	of	basic	human	rights	enjoy	a	kind	of	priority	over	
the	non-instrumental	value	of	political	self-determination.40	That	priority	need	not	
																																																								
39	Stephen	Gardner,	“A	Core	Precautionary	Principle,’	Journal	of	Political	Philosophy	14:1	(2006):	pp.	
45-9.	
40	Remedial-right	theorists	are	clearly	prepared	to	accept	this	claim,	but	there	is	some	evidence	that	
(liberal-)	nationalists	and	plebiscitary	theorists	do	so	as	well.		Altman	and	Wellman,	for	example,	
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be	lexical,	but	we	must	care	relatively	little	about	the	advancement	of	political	self-
determination	in	comparison	to	our	concern	for	setbacks	to	peace	and	the	secure	
enjoyment	of	basic	human	rights.		Third	and	finally,	the	gross	violation	of	basic	
human	rights	and,	typically,	war	(or	widespread	violence)	constitute	a	catastrophic	
or	unacceptable	outcome.41		There	is	some	reason,	then,	to	think	that	in	the	present	
circumstances	we	ought	to	adopt	a	precautionary	approach	to	theorizing	secession,	
																																																								
explicitly	grant	that	where	realizing	peace	and	human	rights	is	incompatible	with	a	legal	right	to	
secession	the	latter	right	must	give	way	(Altman	and	Wellman,	Liberal	Theory,	p.	56).		David	Miller’s	
nuanced	treatment	of	nations’	claim	(but,	explicitly,	not	a	right)	to	secession	suggests	the	protection	
of	human	rights	trumps	the	advancement	of	national	self-determination.		Miller	notes	the	difficulty	of	
“estimating	whether	minority	rights	are	likely	to	be	better	or	worse	protected	if	secession	goes	
ahead,”	but	unfortunately	limits	his	remarks	regarding	what	to	do	in	the	face	of	such	difficulty	to	
identifying	one	way	we	should	not	proceed	(Miller,	“Secession,”	p.	71).		Further	support	for	the	claim	
that	we	care	far	more	about	peace	and	human	rights	than	we	do	about	political	self-determination	
can	be	seen	in	the	large	literature	arguing	for	armed	responses	to	aggression	and	gross	violations	of	
human	rights,	but	hardly	any	arguments	at	all	for	armed	intervention	in	support	of	political	self-
determination	for	groups	that	have	been	neither	recently	forcibly	annexed	nor	subject	to	gross	
violations	of	their	human	rights.			
41	There	is	one	wrinkle	here,	since	just	wars	may	sometimes	be	acceptable.		Elsewhere	I	argue	against	
the	treatment	of	peace	as	a	proper	goal	for	a	morally	defensible	international	law	distinct	from	the	
advancement	of	basic	human	rights	(David	Lefkowitz,	“Reflections	on	the	Thin	Justice	of	
International	Law:	Peace,	Justice,	and	Secession	(Ethics	and	International	Affairs	Online)).		Rather,	
peace	generally	but	not	necessarily	contributes	more	to	the	secure	enjoyment	of	human	rights	than	
does	war.		If	that	argument	is	correct,	we	only	need	hold	that	the	gross	violation	of	basic	human	
rights	counts	as	a	catastrophe.	
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and	this	requires	that	we	exclude	from	our	deliberations	any	argument	for	a	
candidate	norm	premised	on	advancing	or	honoring	the	non-instrumental	value	of	
political	self-determination.		In	other	words,	the	precautionary	approach	entails	that	
we	ought	to	select	among	competing	candidates	for	a	legal	norm	governing	
secession	solely	on	the	basis	of	which	one	we	believe	will	best	serve	to	advance	
peace	and	the	secure	enjoyment	of	basic	human	rights.	
The	precautionary	approach	appears	to	favor	a	remedial	legal	right	over	both	
the	nationalist	and	plebiscitary	primary	rights	to	secession.		The	former	tracks	and	
responds	to	all	and	only	those	goals	on	the	basis	of	which	we	ought	to	assess	
candidate	norms	given	our	current	knowledge,	whereas	the	attractiveness	of	the	
latter	rights	lies	in	their	serving	to	advance	political	self-determination	even	in	cases	
where	doing	so	is	not	necessary	to	secure	peace	or	individuals’	basic	human	rights.		
But	this	is	precisely	the	consideration	that	the	precautionary	approach	requires	we	
exclude	from	our	deliberation.		Of	course,	primary-right	theorists	might	respond	
that	their	favored	legal	norm	will	do	better	at	advancing	peace	and	human	rights	
than	will	a	remedial-right	to	secession.		Note,	first,	that	to	argue	on	these	grounds	
would	constitute	a	significant	shift	from	past	practice,	while	also	implicitly	
conceding	that	at	least	for	purposes	of	a	non-ideal	moral	theory	of	international	law	
their	favored	moral	account	of	secession	is	irrelevant.		But	second,	and	more	
importantly,	it	is	hard	to	see	why	an	international	legal	norm	that	is	not	specifically	
designed	to	advance	the	goal	of	peace	and	the	secure	enjoyment	of	human	rights	
would	do	better	at	achieving	that	end	than	would	a	legal	norm	that	is	specifically	
designed	to	do	so.			
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The	quality	of	the	evidence	available	to	us	might	once	again	be	offered	as	an	
objection	to	drawing	any	moral	conclusion	regarding	the	stance	international	law	
ought	to	take	vis-à-vis	secession.		But	the	question	of	whether	we	have	sufficient	
evidence	to	warrant	some	degree	of	confidence	when	making	an	empirical	claim	is	a	
matter	of	judgment.		With	respect	to	the	effects	on	peace	and	human	rights	that	a	
more	permissive	international	legal	norm	governing	secession	would	have	in	a	
world	organized	more	or	less	as	ours	currently	is,	I	believe	the	evidence	warrants	
some	confidence	that	we	would	see	an	increase	in	systematic	violence	and	a	
decrease	in	the	secure	enjoyment	of	basic	human	rights.		More	importantly,	since	
political	actors	cannot	avoid	engaging	in	practices	that	support	one	or	another	legal	
norm	governing	secession,	they	must	act	on	the	evidence	they	have,	even	if	it	
warrants	only	a	little	confidence	that	one	norm	will	prove	superior	to	another.	
It	is	worth	emphasizing	the	seriousness	of	the	challenge	posed	by	the	
argument	for	agnosticism	vis-à-vis	the	effects	of	different	candidates	for	an	
international	legal	norm	governing	secession.		If	secession	is	an	inherently	
institutional	concept,	then	moral	arguments	for	or	against	a	right	to	secession	(with	
some	specific	content)	can	only	be	moral	arguments	for	the	creation	of	a	legal	right	
to	secession	(with	that	content).		These	arguments	must	be	made	on	the	basis	of	
institutional	moral	reasoning,	which	as	I	explained	earlier	assesses	a	legal	norm	in	
terms	of	its	contribution	to	advancing	the	morally	proper	goals	of	international	law.		
It	follows	that	if	we	lack	the	data	we	need	to	make	any	judgment	regarding	the	
superiority	of	one	candidate	norm	over	its	rivals,	we	cannot	know	whether	there	is	
a	moral	right	to	secession	(and	if	so,	what	its	content	is).		Thus	the	agnosticism	
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Altman	and	Wellman	urge	entails	even	greater	limits	than	they	recognize	on	our	
ability	to	assess	the	morality	of	secession.	
V	
In	the	previous	section	I	argued	that	in	circumstances	like	those	that	
presently	obtain	internationally,	a	remedial-right	to	secession	will	better	serve	the	
goal	of	advancing	peace	and	the	secure	enjoyment	of	basic	human	rights	than	will	a	
primary	right	to	secession.		But	is	a	remedial-right	superior	in	this	respect	to	
international	law’s	current	stance	on	unilateral	secession,	namely	that	outside	the	
colonial	context	no	group	enjoys	a	legal	right	to	unilateral	secession?		In	what	
follows	I	offer	a	number	of	reasons	to	think	it	is	not.		
	 Consider	Buchanan’s	characterization	of	a	remedial-right	to	secession:	a	
territorially	concentrated	group	may	unilaterally	secede	only	if	it	is	the	victim	of	(a)	
forcible	annexation	by	another	state,	or	(b)	serious	and	persistent	violations	of	basic	
human	rights.		At	least	vis-à-vis	the	examples	Buchanan	offers	to	motivate	his	case	
for	a	remedial-right	to	secession	for	victims	of	forcible	annexation,	there	is	no	need	
to	reform	international	law	to	accommodate	the	intuition	that	these	political	
communities	had	a	right	to	statehood.42		Where	one	state’s	forcible	annexation	of	
part	or	all	of	another	state’s	people	and	territory	goes	unrecognized	as	a	matter	of	
international	law,	the	victims	retain	their	pre-existing	legal	right	to	independent	
statehood.		This	was	true	of	the	Baltic	States,	for	instance,	which	were	illegally	
occupied	by	the	Soviet	Union	between	1940	and	1991.		Nor	do	we	need	a	remedial-
																																																								
42	See,	e.g.,	Buchanan,	“Secession,”	section	2.2.	
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right	to	secession	to	account	for	new	states	produced	by	the	dissolution	of	a	state,	as	
in	the	case	of	the	successor	states	to	the	U.S.S.R.	and	Yugoslavia.		Rather,	the	original	
state’s	loss	of	sovereignty	over	people	and	territory	as	part	of	its	dissolution	creates	
the	necessary	legal	space	in	which	the	new	successor	states	can	arise.43		A	graver	
concern	with	a	legal	right	to	unilateral	secession	for	victims	of	forcible	annexation	is	
that	if	it	applies	retroactively,	i.e.	to	forcible	annexations	carried	out	prior	to	the	
incorporation	of	a	remedial-right	to	secession	into	international	law,	it	will	invite	or	
exacerbate	violent	conflict.		Few	if	any	borders	were	established	in	a	manner	free	
from	injustice.		In	theory	this	cost	might	be	outweighed	by	the	deterrent	effect	the	
remedial-right	would	have	on	potential	future	forcible	annexations.		Yet	as	noted	
above,	contemporary	international	law	already	precludes	the	acquisition	of	
sovereignty	over	territory	and	people	through	forcible	annexation,	and	therefore	
already	provides	whatever	deterrence	might	be	achieved	by	the	creation	of	a	right	
to	unilateral	secession	for	victims	of	forcible	annexation.	
We	should	also	be	skeptical	of	a	deterrence	argument	for	a	remedial-right	to	
secession	in	the	case	of	serious	and	persistent	violations	of	basic	human	rights	
perpetrated	or	condoned	by	the	state.	Presumably	the	territorially	concentrated	
victims	of	such	a	campaign	of	human	rights	violations	will	do	whatever	they	can	to	
stop	it,	including	the	use	of	force,	regardless	of	whether	they	have	a	legal	right	to	
secede.		Whatever	deterrent	effect	the	likelihood	of	such	resistance	provides	will	be	
																																																								
43	See	the	discussion	of	the	Badinter	Commission’s	findings	vis-à-vis	the	new	states	that	emerged	on	
the	territory	formerly	ruled	by	Yugoslavia	in	Craven,	“Statehood,”	231.			
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unaffected	by	international	law	granting	the	victims	a	legal	right	to	secede.		Third	
parties,	or	at	least	other	states,	already	enjoy	a	legal	permission	(indeed,	a	
responsibility)	to	aid	victims	of	systematic	and	persistent	violations	of	their	basic	
human	rights	by	their	own	state,	arguably	including	the	provision	of	military	
supplies	and	even	armed	intervention.		That	is,	international	law	either	already	
includes	or	could	be	reformed	to	include	norms	that	serve	at	least	in	part	to	deter	
governments	or	office-holders	from	violating	the	rights	of	their	subjects	by	
threatening	action	that	would	make	their	removal	from	office	(more)	likely,	without	
having	to	sanction	secession.		Such	norms	are	more	likely	to	track	the	interests	of	
political	leaders	than	will	a	norm	permitting	secession,	since	such	leaders	may	be	
less	concerned	with	the	diminishment	of	the	state’s	territory	than	with	remaining	in	
power,	and	so	be	more	deterred	by	threats	to	the	latter	than	to	the	former.		Nor	
should	we	forget	that	international	law	already	permits	a	number	of	practices	that	
can	be	used	to	deter	states	–	or	better,	government	officials	–	from	perpetrating	
gross	violations	of	(some	of)	their	subjects’	basic	human	rights,	including	economic	
sanctions	and	international	criminal	charges.		Taking	all	of	these	considerations	into	
account,	it	seems	highly	unlikely	that	the	fact	that	their	conduct	would	create	a	legal	
right	to	unilateral	secession	for	their	victims	would	make	the	difference	in	state	
officials’	decision	not	to	engage	in	systematic	and	widespread	violations	of	some	of	
their	territorially	concentrated	subjects’	basic	human	rights.	
Moreover,	even	if	we	concede	arguendo	that	a	remedial-right	to	secession	
would	make	a	small	contribution	to	deterring	violations	of	basic	human	rights,	we	
must	also	take	into	account	any	incentives	for	perpetrating	such	violations	this	right	
	 37	
would	create.		Donald	Horowitz,	for	example,	argues	that	were	international	law	to	
include	a	right	to	remedial	secession	some	would-be	separatists	would	be	motivated	
to	provoke	the	state	that	rules	them	into	violent	crackdowns	against	their	group,	in	
the	hope	of	acquiring	a	legal	right	to	secede.44		There	is	some	evidence	that	exactly	
this	line	of	thought	motivated	the	Kosovo	Liberation	Army’s	conduct	in	the	late	
1990s.45		Kemoklidze	argues	that	the	recognition	of	Kosovo	as	an	independent	state	
by	some	members	of	the	international	community	created	a	moral	hazard	
subsequently	realized	in	the	separatist	conflict	in	South	Ossetia.46		Others	might	add	
attempts	at	secession	in	Abkhazia	and	Crimea.		Of	course,	we	must	be	careful	here;	
actual	examples	of	such	conduct	will	not	show	that	recognition	of	a	legal	right	to	
secession	would	increase	their	incidence,	since	they	occurred	in	the	absence	of	such	
a	right.		Nevertheless,	they	do	provide	evidence	that	some	actors	seeking	
independence	are	prepared	to	instigate	great	violence	against	the	very	people	
whose	interests	they	claim	to	be	seeking	to	advance.		Therefore,	we	should	be	wary	
of	legal	reforms	that	might	encourage	these	actors	to	pursue	such	a	course	of	action,	
																																																								
44	Donald	Horowitz,	“A	Right	to	Secede?”	in	Stephen	Macedo	and	Allen	Buchanan	(eds.),	Secession	and	
Self-Determination,	NOMOS	XLV	(New	York:	New	York	University	Press,	2003).	
45	See	Alan	J.	Kuperman,	“The	Moral	Hazard	of	Humanitarian	Intervention:	Lessons	from	the	
Balkans,”	International	Studies	Quarterly	52:1	(2008):	49-80.		For	a	contrary	view,	see	Alex	J.	Bellamy	
and	Paul	D.	Williams,	“On	the	Limits	of	Moral	Hazard:	The	Responsibility	to	Protect,	Armed	Conflict,	
and	Mass	Atrocities,”	European	Journal	of	International	Relations	18:3	(2012):	pp.	539-71.	
46	Nino	Kemoklidze,	“The	Kosovo	Precedent	and	the	‘Moral	Hazard’	of	Secession,”	Journal	of	
International	Law	and	International	Relations	5:2	(2009):	117-140.	
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particularly	if	we	have	compelling	reasons	to	doubt	those	reforms	will	produce	
much	good.	
Perhaps	a	remedial-right	to	secession	can	be	defended	on	the	grounds	that	
its	successful	exercise	will	lead	to	a	decrease	in	the	future	incidence	of	states’	
grossly	violating	their	subjects’	basic	human	rights.		Where	such	a	campaign	has	
taken	place,	it	might	be	thought	that	the	likelihood	that	the	perpetrators	and	the	
victims	will	be	able	to	co-exist	as	equal	citizens	of	even	a	federal	state	is	less	than	
the	likelihood	that	they	will	be	able	to	co-exist	as	citizens	of	two	independent	states.		
Whether	this	is	true	depends	on	a	host	of	factors,	however.		For	example,	the	
division	of	the	original	state	may	give	rise	to	irridentist	conflicts,	or	to	systematic	
persecution	of	members	of	one	group	that	remain	“trapped”	within	the	territory	of	
the	state	in	which	the	other	group	is	a	majority.		Indeed,	a	recent	study	by	Sambanis	
and	Schulhofer-Wohl	concludes	that	partition	does	not	prevent	the	recurrence	of	
civil	war.47		More	importantly,	whether	a	single-	or	two-state	solution	is	most	likely	
to	reduce	the	likelihood	of	conflict	in	the	future	depends	on	a	variety	of	factors	that	
vary	from	case	to	case.48		Better,	then,	to	adopt	a	legal	norm	that	gives	international	
actors	greater	flexibility	to	determine	in	each	case	which	course	of	action	will	best	
serve	to	advance	peace	and	the	secure	enjoyment	of	basic	human	rights.		I	contend	
																																																								
47	Sambanis	and	Schulhofer-Wohl,	“What’s	in	a	Line?”	International	Security	34:2	(2009):	82-118.	
48	Among	the	myriad	factors	that	Sirosky	identifies	in	his	three-level	analysis	of	the	causes	of	
secession	are	political	grievances,	economic	inequalty,	ethno-demography,	ethno-geography,	the	
state’s	institutional	capacity	and	strength,	state	policies	of	repression	and	inclusion,	and	other	states	
strategic	interests.		See	Siroky,	“Explaining	Secession.”		
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that	by	this	measure	the	existing	international	legal	norm	governing	secession	is	
superior	to	one	that	would	create	a	remedial-right.		While	the	current	norm	
recognizes	no	right	to	unilateral	secession	it	does	permit	consensual	secession,	even	
in	cases	where	that	takes	place	in	conditions	that	could	hardly	be	described	as	
voluntary.		The	secession	of	South	Sudan	provides	a	contemporary	example;	
Eritrea’s	a	slightly	older	one.			
Of	course,	this	argument	entails	that	vis-à-vis	their	prospects	for	
independent	statehood,	members	of	a	group	that	has	been	subject	to	gross	
violations	of	their	basic	human	rights	by	the	state	that	rules	them	are	largely	at	the	
mercy	of	other	states’	willingness	to	pressure	their	state	into	holding	a	referendum	
on	secession.		This	may	strike	many	readers	as	problematic.		Surely	the	fate	of	these	
victims	should	not	rest	on	power	and	interest;	rather,	they	should	enjoy	an	
entitlement,	a	right,	to	their	own	state.		While	understandable,	this	reaction	is	
mistaken	for	two	reasons.		First,	whether	a	group	ought	to	enjoy	an	international	
legal	right	to	secession	depends	on	the	contribution	a	norm	according	groups	of	that	
type	such	a	right	will	make	to	the	advancement	of	peace	and	the	secure	enjoyment	
of	human	rights.		The	mere	observation	that	a	candidate	legal	norm	will	leave	
certain	actors	dependent	on	politics	does	not	suffice	to	show	that	the	norm	is	
unjustifiable.		Second,	it	is	a	mistake	to	oppose	law	and	politics,	and	to	think	that	the	
creation	of	a	legal	right	to	remedial	secession	offers	an	alternative	to	power	and	
interest	–	to	politics	–	as	a	means	for	achieving	peace	and	the	secure	enjoyment	of	
basic	human	rights.		Law	can	serve	to	channel	politics,	to	shape	its	exercise,	but	so	
too	power	and	politics	shape	the	form	and	exercise	of	law,	as	would	no	doubt	be	
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true	were	international	law	to	incorporate	a	remedial-right	to	secession.		What	we	
must	aim	for,	therefore,	is	not	the	replacement	of	politics	with	law	but	the	optimal	
mix	of	law	and	politics.		My	position	is	that	at	present	it	is	the	existing	international	
legal	norm	governing	secession	that	does	so,	not	a	remedial-right.		
One	last	argument	for	an	international	legal	right	to	remedial	secession	
focuses	on	the	effect	that	such	a	legal	norm	would	have	over	time	on	actors’	legal	
consciousness;	that	is,	the	way	in	which	international	law	informs	actors’	
construction	of	the	social	world	they	inhabit.49		Specifically,	the	claim	is	that	
international	law’s	incorporation	of	a	remedial-right	to	secession	would	contribute	
to	the	on-going	project	of	reconceiving	sovereignty	as	first	and	foremost	a	means	to	
the	protection	and/or	promotion	of	human	rights.		The	crucial	question	here	
concerns	the	marginal	contribution	the	creation	of	an	international	legal	norm	
creating	a	right	to	unilateral	remedial	secession	would	have	on	the	advancement	of	
the	human	rights	revolution	in	international	affairs.		This	is	an	exceedingly	difficult	
question	to	answer,	but	my	suspicion	is	that	the	answer	is	“not	much.”		Certainly	
international	law	need	not	adopt	a	remedial-right	to	secession	in	order	to	convey	an	
understanding	of	state	sovereignty	(or	jurisdiction)	as	instrumentally	valuable	and	
conditional.					
																																																								
49	For	general	discussion,	see	Paul	Schiff	Berman,	“Seeing	Beyond	the	Limits	of	International	Law,”	
Texas	Law	Review,	84	(2006):	pp.	1265-1306;	Jutta	Brunnee,	and	Stephen	J.	Toope,	“Constructivism	
and	International	Law”	in	J.	L.	Dunoff	and	M.	A.	Pollack	(eds.)	Interdisciplinary	Perspectives	on	
International	Law	and	International	Relations:	The	State	of	the	Art	(New	York:	Cambridge	University	
Press,	2013).	
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	 		The	foregoing	considerations,	then,	provide	a	strong	case	for	the	conclusion	
that,	at	least	at	present	and	for	the	foreseeable	future,	international	law	will	likely	
better	serve	to	advance	peace	and	the	secure	enjoyment	of	basic	human	rights	if	it	
includes	no	right	to	secession,	rather	than	a	remedial	one.		These	arguments	are	
conditional	on	empirical	premises,	of	course.		The	complexity	of	the	phenomena	in	
question	and	the	limits	on	our	ability	to	control	the	many	variables	that	are	
plausibly	thought	to	contribute	to	the	incidence	of	demands	for	secession,	as	well	as	
the	use	of	violence	to	advance	or	respond	to	such	demands,	warrants	considerable	
modesty	when	drawing	a	conclusion	based	on	such	claims.		As	I	argued	earlier,	
however,	we	must	choose	some	norm	to	govern	secession,	and	given	the	
institutional	nature	of	the	concept	of	secession	and	the	demands	of	institutional	
moral	reasoning,	we	must	choose	on	the	basis	of	the	best	information	currently	
available	to	us.	
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